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DISCHARGE OF HUNG JURY
The maxim that "no person shall, for the same offense, be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb"' is an established 2 part of American
jurisprudence. This rule, however, is subject to recognized exceptions.
It is well-settled that if a jury, after due deliberation, is unable to
agree upon a verdict, the absolute necessity exception3 may be applied
'Pa. Const. art. I, § 10.
The double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion is not applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. Barktus v.
Illinois, 359, U.S. 121 (1959); Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953); Palko
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937); United States ex rel. Melton v. Hendrick, 218
F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Pa. 1963); Robb v. State, 19o Md. 641, 60 A.2d 211 (1948); State
v. Berry, 298 S.W.2d 429 (Mo. 1957); State v. Robinson, ioo Ohio App. 466, 137
N.E.2d 141 (1956); Commonwealth ex rel. Backus v. Cavell, 186 Pa. Super. 48, 140
A.2d 355 (1958)-
The double jeopardy provision is applicable only to criminal prosecutions. State
v. Puckett, 92 Ariz. 407, 377 P.2d 779 (1963); City of Macon v. Massey, 214 Ga.
589, 1o6 S.E.2d 23 (1958); State v. Labato, 7 N.J. 137, So. A.2d 617 (1961); McGil-
licuddy v. Monaghan, 2o Misc. 650, 112 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup. Ct. 1952). There is,
however, a division of authority as to the moment jeopardy attaches. The ma-
jority of jurisdictions hold that jeopardy attaches when a legally constituted jury has
been impaneled and sworn. E.g., Crawford v. United States, 285 F.2d 661 (D.C.
Cir. 196o); Artrip v. State, 41 Ala. App. 492, 136 So. 2d 574 (1962); Hutson v.
Superior Court, 203 Cal. App. 2d 687, 21 Cal. Rptr. 753 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962);
Ferguson v. State, 219 Ga. 33, 131 S.E.2d 538 (1963); State v. Slorah, 118 Me. 203,
io6 Ad. 768 (1919); People ex rel. Rosebrough v. Casey, 251, 867, 297 N.Y.S.
13 (1937); State v. Whitman, 93 Utah 557, 74 P.2d 696 (1937).
It has been held, however, that jeopardy does not attach until there has been
an acquittal or conviction. State v. Buente, 256 Mo. 227, 165 S.W. 340 (1914); State
v. Van Ness, 82 N.J.L. 181, 83 Atl. 195 (Sup. Ct. 1912). Under either view, therefore,
an arraignment and plea alone do not place the defendant in jeopardy. Maloney
v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 84, 186 N.E.2d 728 (1962); State v. Fish, 20 Wis. 2d 431, 122
N.W.2d 381 (1963).
A majority of jurisdictions apply the double jeopardy clause to felonies, minor
crimes, and misdemeanors. E.g., Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873);
United States v. Farwell, 76 F. Supp. 35 (D. Alaska 1948); State v. O'Brien, 1o6
Vt. 97, 17o Atl. 98 (1934).
2A prohibition against double jeopardy is contained in the constitutions of all
but five states. Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 435 (1953). The other five
states are: Connecticut: Kohlfuss v. Warden of Conn. State Prison, 149 Conn.
692, 183 A.2d 626 (1962); Maryland: Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524, 14o A.2d 914
(1958); Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. McCan, 277 Mass. 199, 178 N.E. 633 (1931);
North Carolina: State v. Brickhead, 256 N.C. 494, 124 S.E.2d 838 (1962); and Ver-
mont; State v. O'Brien, io6 Vt. 97, 17o Ad. 98 (1934). All these states prohibit
double jeopardy as part of their common law.
'The Supreme Court of the United States adopted the exception to the federal
rule in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824), wherein a trial in-
volving a capital offense was terminated prematurely due to the failure of the jury
to reach a verdict. In giving the opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice Story stated,
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and the jury may be discharged.4 The decision effectuating the dis-
charge is within the sound discretion of the trial court.5 Such a dis-
charge based on necessity does not preclude a retrial of the accused
for the same offense.0
A different situation is presented, however, where, the trial court
abuses its discretion in discharging a jury due to its inability to reach
agreement. In such cases, it is held that upon a retrial, the accused
may successfully plead former jeopardy.
This situation arose recently in the Pennsylvania case of Common-
wealth v. Baker.7 The defendant was indicted and tried for murder in
the first degree. Approximately nine and one-half hours after the
jury retired to deliberate on its verdict, it returned to the courtroom
in disagreement. Upon being asked by the court if there were any
possibility that a verdict might be reached, the forelady said that the
jury was hopelessly divided and asked that the court declare a mis-
"We think that in all cases of this nature, the law has invested courts of justice
with the authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their
opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest neces-
sity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated." 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) at 580.
The exception is inapplicable, however, where, in a prosecution for a felony, the
defendant is absent at the time of discharge through no fault of his own. In such
a case, a plea of double jeopardy will be substained. State v. Sommers, 6o Minn.
go, 61 N.W. 907 (1895).
'Keerl v. Montana, 213 U.S. 135 (19o9); Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902);
Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892); United States v. Lynch, 94 F. Supp.
1ol (N.D. Ga. 193o); State v. Woodring, 386 P.2d 851 (Ariz. 1963); People v. Sulli-
van, iol Cal. App. 2d 322, 225, P.2d 645 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950); Commonwealth v.
Cody, 165 Mass. 133, 42 N.E. 575 (1896); People v. Pline, 61 Mich. 247, 28 N.V. 83
(1886); State v. Eisentrager, 76 Nev. 437, 537 P.2d 30 (1g6o); State v. Brooks, 59 N.M.
130, 297 P.2d 1048 (1955) Strickland v. State, 169 Tex. Grim. 550, 336 S.V.2d 185
(196o).
ORothaus v. United States, 319 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Potash,
118 F.id 54 (2d Cir. 1941); Hyde v. State, 196 Ga. 475, 26 S.E. 2d 744 (1943); People
v. Touhy, 361 Ill. 332, 197 N.E. 849 (1935); State v. Critelli, 237 Iowa 1271, 24
N.W.2d 113 (1946); State v. Block, 119 N.J.L. 277, ig At. 225 (1938); Mack v.
Commonwealth, 177 Va. 921, 15 S.E.2d 62 (1941).
California follows a stricter rule than the United States Supreme Court in the
discretion given to the trial judge to discharge juries without leading to double
jeopardy. See Cardeas v. Superior Court, r6 Cal. 2d 273, 363 P.2d 889, 14 Cal. Rptr.
657 (1g6i).
The authority to discharge a jury rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court, which does not have to follow the wishes of the jury. United States v. Haskel,
26 Fed. Cas. 207 (No. 15321) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
"People v. Greer, 3o Cal. 2d 589, 184 P.2d 512 (1947); People v. Demes, 33
Cal. Rptr. 896 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); People .'. Deerman, s6g Cal App. 2d 8o8,
337 P.2d 853 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959); State v. Berry, 298 S.W.2d 129 (Mo. 1957);
State v. Roller, 29 N.J. 339, 149 A.2d 238 (1959).
7413 Pa. io5, 196 A.2d 382 (1964).
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trial. The court complied with the request over the objection of the
Commonwealth, and with neither the consent nor objection of the de-
fendant.
When again prosecuted for murder in the first degree, the de-
fendant filed a plea of double jeopardy which was sustained. On ap-
peal, the Commonwealth contended that the declaration of the mis-
trial was a valid exercise of judicial discretion, and that the de-
fendant, by his silence, had consented to the discharge of the jury.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower court on the
ground that discharge of the jury at the first indication of disagree-
ment is an arbitrary exercise of discretion. Relying on Commonwealth
v. Melton,s the court reasoned that since an accused cannot be tried
for a criminal offense of which he has been previously acquitted, and
since the trial court's arbitrary action was, in effect, an acquittal,
jeopardy had attached to the defendant, and he could not be tried
again for first degree murder.9
In rejecting the second contention of the Commonwealth that the
defendant, by remaining silent, tacitly consented to the discharge of
the jury, the court stated that "the maxim that silence gives consent
should not be applied to a situation as grave and a constitutional right
as important as this."10 Therefore, while most jurisdictions hold that
the protection of the former jeopardy doctrine is personal and may
be waived,: the failure to object to a discharge of the jury does not
constitute such a waiver.'
2
84o6 Pa. 343, 178 A.2d 728 (1962).
OKansas, however, has said that when a mistrial is declared due to the inability
of a jury to agree upon a verdict, "the defendant has not been in jeopardy" so
that he may be subsequently tried for the same offense. See Struble v. Gnadt, 164
Kan. 587, 191 P.2d 179, 183 (1948).
'"Commonwealth v. Baker, 413 Pa. io5 , 196 A.2d at 387. See Davis v. State, 144
Tex. Grim. 474, 164 S.W.2d 686 (1942).
uE.g., Brooks v. State, 152 So. 2d 441 (Ala. App. 1963); People v. Allen, 18
App. Div. 2d 840, 238 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1963); Pasternack v. Block, 35 Misc. 2d 16,
23o N.Y.S.2d 259 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
'-E.g., Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (9 th Cir. 1949); Commonwealth
v. Gray, 249 Ky. 36, 6o S.W.2d 133 (1933); Davis v. State, 144 Tex. Grim. 474, 164
S.W.2d 686 (1942).
In New Mexico, however, a plea of double jeopardy is properly overruled
unless the accused objects to the discharge of the jury. State v. Woo Dak San, 35
N.M. 1o5, 290 Pac. 322 (1930).
If the accused moves for a mistrial, he has manifested his consent and waived
his right to plead double jeopardy. United States v. Burrell, 324 F.2d 115 (7th Cir.
1963) (defendant moved for mistrial because two witnesses, who, by court order,
were supposed to be separated, had discussed the case prior to the trial); United
States v. Harriman, 13o F. Supp. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (defendant moved for mistrial
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The principal case appears to apply a more strict rule than the
Second Circuit did in United States v. Cording,13 which held that im-
mediate discharge of the jury after its initial report of disagreement
was not an abuse of the court's discretion. The Cording14 case is dis-
tinguishable, however, because the defendant was on trial for illegally
selling heroin, which is a noncapital offense. The principal case in-
volved the capital offense of first degree murder. Thus, as the gravity
of the offense increases, the courts require a stronger showing of neces-
sity to justify the discharge of a jury when it is unable to agree upon
a verdict.
The cases are in substantial agreement that when a jury disagrees
upon the verdict to be rendered,15 or upon the penalty to be im-
posed 16 and is validly discharged, the disagreement, in effect, nullifies
the trial. The problem, therefore, is in determining whether the dis-
charge is an abuse of discretion. In this determination, no concrete
formula can be applied, and the court's discretionary power is sub-
ject only to the restraint that it must not be arbitrary.'
7
The decision to discharge a jury, which is unable to reach a ver-
dict, however, is not absolutely within the discretion of the trial
court. The defendant's valued right to have his trial completed and
punishment assessed by the particular jury that was charged with his
deliverance is protected by the power of appellate review over the
trial court's decision. If a clear abuse of discretion is proved by the de-
fendant, he is entitled to a reversal.' 8 In several cases, a clear abuse
of discretion has been found.
because of prejudicial variance between indictment and proof); Kamen v. Gray,
169 Kan. 664, 220 P.2d 16o (195o) (defendant moved for mistrial because of erroneous
admission of a police report); State v. Wolak, 33 N.J. 399, 165 A.2d 174 (1960)
(defendant moved for a mistrial because of alleged misconduct of the prosecutor);
Gang v. State, 191 Tenn. 468, 234 S.W.2d 997 (195 o) (mistrial declared with agree-
ment of defendant when jury was unable to agree upon a verdict).
Hipple v. State, So Tex. Grim. 531, 191 S.V. 1150 (1916), held that the consent
of defense counsel to the granting of the State's motion for a mistrial would not
be binding on the defendant who remained silent.
129o F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1961).
'AIbid.
"-State v. Woodring, 386 P.2d 851 (Ariz. 1963); State v. King, 121 Kan. 139, 245
Pac. ios8 (1926); People v. Bishop, 38 Misc. 2d 1o6, 238 N.Y.S.2d 107 (Sup. Ct.
1962); Usary v. State, 172 Tenn. 305, 112 S.A.2d 7 (1938).
"Villarreal v. State, 172 Tex. Grim. 213, 355 S.W.2d 516 (1962).
17Yarbrough v. State, go Okla. Grim. 74, 210 P.2d 375 (1949).
nUnited States v. Potash, 118 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1941); Kastel v. United States,
23 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1927); Hyde v. State, 196 Ga. 475, 26 S.E.2d 744 (1943); State
v. Brooks, 59 N.M. 130, 279 P.2d 1048 (1955); Murphy v. State, 149 Tex. Grim. 624,
198 S.W.2d 98 (1946); State v. Hemmenway, 12o N.V.2d 561 (S.D. 1963).
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In Grigsby v. State,19 where the trial judge declared a mistrial
after the jury had deliberated approximately an hour and forty-five
minutes, the court was found to have abused its discretion as to the
deliberation time allowed the jury and as to the time when the jury
should have been discharged. A jury, therefore, must deliberate until
it is improbable that further deliberation will result in a verdict.2 0
Extensive deliberation, however, may exceed the demands of public
justice for as the deliberation time lengthens, the risk of coercion is
greatly increased. Therefore, when, within a reasonable time, it be-
comes apparent to the trial court that agreement, if reached, may be
coerced, the court should grant a mistrial and discharge the jury.21
Although the deliberation time involved is a factor to be con-
sidered,22 it is not necessarily controlling. State v. Reddich2 3 held
that discharging a jury which had deliberated only two and one-half
hours was a valid exercise of judicial discretion. Also, it has been
held24 that a deliberate decision by a trial judge to have a jury dis-
charged by the minute clerk if the jury was unable to agree upon a
verdict within five hours will not support a plea of double jeopardy25
The limitation on the scope of the court's discretion, however, pre-
vents discharging the jury merely upon an extra-judicial report from
the jury that it is unable to agree upon a verdict. In People v. Cage,26
the sheriff was requested by the court to ask the jury, while they were
deliberating, if they had reached a verdict. Due to a negative answer,
the court was adjourned for the term which was to end by operation
of law on the ensuing day. In holding that the court's action provided
grounds for a successful plea of double jeopardy, the Supreme Court
of California said that there is "no necessity for the final adjourn-
ment of the Court before the fixed limit of the term is reached."
27
The court also stated that if the jury could not reach a verdict, it
158 Tex. Crim. 484, 257 S.W.2d 110 (1953).
"'State v. Whitman, 93 Utah 557, 74 P.2d 696 (1937).
2'Commonwealth v. Kent, 355 Pa. 146, 49 A.2d 388 (1946).
-2Green v. State, 167 Tex. Grim. 330, 320 S.V.2d 139 (1958).
u76 N.J. Super. 347, 184 A.2d 652 (1962).
24
United States v. Fitz Gerald, 2o5 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. 111. 1962).
raIn justifying its decision, the court said "that the trial judge made a deliberate
decision as to when the jury should be discharged for failure to agree, that it was
the trial judge's decision and not his minute clerk's, that it was announced in the
presence of counsel. It is clear that it was not done at a moment when it was
believed the jury was about to acquit the defendant and therefore knowingly
deprived him of an acquittal." Id. at 517-18.
'48 Cal. 323 (1874).
21M. at 328.
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should have reported that fact in the presence of the court and the
defendant. The jury, therefore, should be questioned individually as
to the probability of reaching a verdict,2s and a mistrial is not justi-
fied upon a mere statement by the jury that it is unable to agree.29
In such a case, the jurors may only be confused, and it is the duty of
the trial judge to correct any misconception that the jury may have30
and to encourage agreement upon a verdict,3 ' but he must also give
them an opportunity to consider the additional instructions. Dis-
charging the jury before it sufficiently considers such additional in-
structions would be an abuse of the trial court's discretion.
Since the determination to declare a mistrial in jury disagreement
cases is dependent upon the particular circumstances of each case,
an abuse of discretion is extremely difficult to prove. It is apparent,
therefore, that although a trial court may abuse its discretion in dis-
charging a "hung jury," the majority of cases, due to insufficient evi-
dence, reject claims of abuse of discretion.3 2 In the absence of an
arbitrary decision by the trial court, however, it is submitted that
since guilt remains undetermined when a jury is discharged during
deliberation, the ends of justice will best be met by a retrial.
ROBERT STEPHEN PLFSS
2Paulson v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 1, 372 P.2d 641, 22 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1962).
-'People v. Parker, 145 Mich. 488, ioS N.W. 999 (19o6); People ex rel. Stabile v.
Warden of City Prison, 202 N.Y. 138, 95 N.E. 729 (1911).
-"Hyde v. State, 196 Ga. 475, 26 S.E.2d 744 (1933).
Moreover, in Marcus v. State, 149 Ga. 209, 99 S.E. 614 (1919), it was held that
the court can recharge the jury without receiving a request from them.
"'In seeking to impress upon the jury the desirability of reaching a verdict,
the court should remember that "Juries should be left free to act without any real
or seeming coercion on the part of the court, and the verdict should as to the facts,
be the result of their own free and voluntary action." White v. Fulton, 68 Ga. 511,
513 (1882).
I'E.g., United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824); Gilmore v. United
States, 264 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1959); Dortch v. United States, 203 F.2d 709 (6th Cir.
1953); People v. Green, ioo Cal. 140, 34 Pac 63o (1893); Ex parte McLaughlin, 41
Cal. 211 (1871); People v. Westwood, 154 Cal. App. 2d 406, 316 P.2d 23 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1957); State v. Eisentrager, 76 Nev. 437, 357 P.2d 306 (196o); State v. Roller,
29 N.J. 339, 149 A.2d 238 (1959); State v. Hemmenway, 12o N.V.2d 561 (S.D. 1963);
Miller v. State, 167 Tex. Crim. 533, 322 S.W.2d 289 (1959).
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